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There are three issues that clearly reflect efficiency of multilateralism in
the European Union, European Security Strategy (ESS), and the relations
with the USA. It is the matter of energy security, intervention in Afghanistan
and the establishment of ABM defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic.
In the energy policy there is no dialogues between Europe and the USA,
but there is a dialogue between the USA and Russia as well as between
the EU and Russia. Afghanistan is a test case for the credibility of NATO.
Do the USA and the EU agree on the global role of NATO?
The ABM missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic is
financed solely by the USA, but the public opinion in Europe is that
it is one of the worst initiatives that had divided Europe
into the old and the new.
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1. Introduction
Simon Serfaty, who holds the Z. Brzezinski
Chair at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies in Washington, said some wise words that
put in a nutshell the dilemma confronting us:
NATO has transformed itself beyond recog-
nition. Yet many fear that the alliance has gone astray.
Europeans and Americans often feel ambivalent
about NATO because they neglect its achievements,
question its current actions, and differ what it should
do next.'
He said this reflecting on the NATO summit
in Riga last year. The problem was that the summit
did not come up with a new strategic concept, nor
did it commission that a new one should be drawn
up for the next summit in 2008.
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But he did say that, nevertheless, it was a
success. I will quote Serfaty again because to me
the reasons he spells out for this success illustrate
the present atmosphere oftrying to come together
that both the USA and the EU in the face of a
growing common realization that the West is rap-
idly shrinking in what may now be called the
Asian century of diminishing energy supplies and
security? We are witnesses to emerging multi-
polar world where China will loom large, but
would it be provocative to propose that both parts
ofthe West, i.e. the USA/Canada and the EU are
- trying, but nevertheless not coming together in
the face of the new challenges and new world or-
der?
According to Serfaty, the summit was a suc-
cess because, apart from the basic summit diplo-
macy principle that says summits cannot fail, it,
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2. Energy Securityin fact, did take place, it evoked a reasonable dis-
play of collegial courtesy as if the leaders actu-
ally liked each other, and, most of all, it took place
in Latvia, showing how far NATO has come since
its previous summits in 1999, 2002, 2004, which
were marked by sharp clashes over issues rang-
ing from Iraq to the alliance's future global mis-
sion. Thus the Riga summit is a benchmark in
the trying part of my proposition?
When thinking about EU-American rela-
tions it seems to me a paradox that it is so hard
for both sides to come together if the security
strategies, as, indeed, the very basic values of both
sides, are pretty much the same. Practically the
only significant difference between the European
Security Strategy and the American National Se-
curity Strategy is that one word, preemptive. The
Europeans, after agonizing for a while, opted for
pre-engagement instead of preemptive in their strat-
egy.
Yet, if the gap consists of only this one word,
is it so formidable that it precludes all efforts to
come together? If Henry Kissinger now said that
preemption should be the rare exception, not the
basic rule of American strategy and this is, after
the demise of the neocons, the basic position of
the USA today, then the trying aspect ofthe propo-
sition could succeed and a common foreign and
security policy spanning the Atlantic could be
achieved. Is not Kissinger's definition the same
as that of the Europeans?' After all, if the Euro-
peans become serious about their "battle groups",
they just might have to be used for preemptive
purposes as well, for example, in the Balkans and
Africa. What is the purpose of battle groups other
than to do battle?
Looking at some outstanding issues on the ta-
ble, we note, however, that this theoretical gap bridg-
ing immediately runs into practical problems. I have
chosen the three most outstanding challenges, be-
cause they also reveal how divided the Europeans
themselves are despite their common security strat-
egy, which, by the way, was unanimously adopted in
2003 by all member states, and included the signa-
tures of the new soon-to-be member states. They are
divided not only among themselves but also within
themselves.
The three outstanding issues are energy se-
curity; Afghanistan, and the planned ABM defense
system to be established in Poland and the Czech
Republic.
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Last year the EU announced the launching
of a new initiative called the European External
Energy Policy (EEP). The problem here is that
there is no common energy market, as there is a
common trade market in the EU. When the EU
flexes its muscles on trade, everybody listens, be-
cause the EU is a global player in trade. Not en-
ergy. The national policies of each member state
vary considerably, especially for those states that
have national energy champions. Europe is pres-
ently hopelessly divided, but may, over time, come
together.
The other problem is that there is no energy
dialogue between the EU and the USA, though there
is between the USA and Russia and the EU and Rus-
sia. Furthermore, the USA is hardly dependent on
Russia for gas and oil, Europe is. What can NATO
do in this regard? Very little.
Another problem is that the EU worried about
gas supply cessations to itself, but not to Moldova,
Georgia, and Azerbaijan. I have been at conferences
where energy representatives from governments and
energy companies claimed that Russia was a reli-
able provider, completely ignoring the in-between
countries, even the Baltic states, now members,
which have had gas (1990s) and oil shutoffs (cur-
rently) by pipelines from Russia. The irony is that
Georgia and Azerbaijan, vulnerable European
Neighborhood Policy states, will, in the end, become
completely independent from Russian gas. What are
the implications of this state of affairs for the EU,
and member states like, for example, Germany? In
answer, I will quote just one sentence from the re-
cent report by the Institut Montaigne, Paris, from a
list of recommendations that would establish a com-
mon foreign policy in the energy field:
impose prior European-level coordination
before any bilateral governmental negotiations (es-
pecially with Russia) and in the event of failure of
the co-operative approach with that country, not to
hesitate to adopt internal measures aimed at defend-
ing European interests?
The Georgians and Azaris would have no
problem with this recommendation. For some older
EU member states it could be an insurmountable
problem. And I have not even mentioned the Gas
OPEC being set up as Russia's initiative.
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3. Afghanistan
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As was said at the Riga summit, this country
is a test case for the credibility of NATO. The prob-
lem here is that while everybody understands that
the civil reconstruction of the country is more im-
portant than the military dimension, you need to fight
in order to be able to do the reconstruction. Can
NATO armies be divided into two categories, into
peacekeepers and warriors, i.e. soldiers that protect
civilians and are not allowed to fight, and soldiers
that do fight and die?
In Afghanistan we see the Americans, Brits,
Canadians, Dutch and Danes fighting, together with
the Australians, who are not in NATO. Some BaIts
are also on pretty dangerous ground and have taken
casualties. Can the Europeans and the Americans
agree on the global role of NATO in such a situa-
tion?
In fact, the problem does not so much lie in
NATO and the EU in helping the country, but in Pa-
kistan and India settling their differences. As long
as this is not done - and, it must be said that both
countries are striving to reach an agreement, terror-
ists coming from the same camps will continue to
operate in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Pakistan cre-
ated the Taliban to control Afghanistan as a strate-
gic hinterland in a possible war with India, but, in
the end, created a Frankenstein monster which it no
longer can control and which threatens Pakistan it-
self Can the EU and the USA working together bring
their weight to bear in helping both countries over-
come their antagonism?
4. The ABM Defense Shield
The controversy about this shield involving
ten missiles in Poland that could knock out Iranian
or North Korean missiles aimed at the USA (or parts
of Europe) with kinetic energy once again reminds
us of the salient issues that divide Europe, divide
political parties within EU countries, and, perhaps,
may divide the EU and the USA.
I take up this issue because the Russian for-
eign minister Sergei Lavrov appears to be striving to
replace Javier Solana as the spokesman for Euro-
pean foreign and security policy. Without batting an
eyelid, Lavrov pontificates on the need of unity of
both the EU and NATO (he is worried that the shield
"undermines NATO and the EU" and that it "endan-
gers the transatlantic bond")? But do ten missiles, as
claimed by Lavrov, overturn the strategic balance by
directly threatening Russia? Or is it, as Michael
Gorbachev points out, a question about who has in-
fluence in Europe: Russia or the USA?4
This is neither a NATO nor an ESDP project.
Should it be a NATO or EU project? At the Riga
summit NATO decided on a mobile theatre defense
ABM system to be ready by 2013-15, but this would
protect only NATO forces. A larger system for terri-
torial and population defense against international
ballistic missiles is under study, but has run into trou-
ble because France and Germany are not ready to
invest the money needed. Obviously it cannot be an
EU project.
The missile defense system to be built in Po-
land and the Czech Republic is financed solely by
the USA - all information can be found at the home
page of the Missile Defense Agency that is building
it.' Americans are ready to pay for defense. Where
does this leave both the EU and NATO with regard
to the USA and Russia, if the American secretary of
defense has offered Russia to be a full partner in the
project? Not only in sharing information, but also in
developing new technology, and even defense radar
system? Russia is driving a hard bargain and may
just get what it wants."
The problem in Europe is, as Philip Stephens
of the FT reminds us, in the matter of security, pub-
lic opinion is disposed to believe the worst of any
new US initiative since Rumsfeld divided Europe
into Old and New Europe, and the shield feeds the
neuroses the Europeans have toward the USA after
the Iraq war. Not so much in the new member states,
I might add, because, as direct neighbours of Rus-
sia, they are more sensitive to developments in Rus-
sia and what this could mean for them further down
the road.
I would agree with Philip Stephens that Putin
must be wearing a very broad smile over the contro-
versy in Europe over the ABM defense shield.
5. Conclusion
I am strongly tempted to conclude that Europe
is back in the power politics game (if ever it left it)
both within itself, with the USA, and its dealings
with Russia. This may be normal, but a realistic bal-
ancing of values and interests with a rising Russia
has occurred just as, indeed, it has happened in
America over the Iraq debacle. The question is
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Iwhether the values will become so insignificant in
our Realpolitik foreign policy agenda that they be-
came only mantra without substance. Looking at how
the member states building Galileo, the European
satellite navigation system, (a "core" of only five
states, and all euro states except for Great Britain),
are bickering and fighting amongst themselves, and
wasting great sums of taxpayers money, and, further,
seeing how Russia and China, while receiving eco-
nomic aid from the EU, might overtake the EU with
their versions of Galileo, one wonders if the EU has
not already become fragmented in substance while
still united in form.? One Russian think-tank guru
called the EU a "camel train" at a Wilton Park con-
ference in February. He asked who needed money
from the EU.
This exacerbates the question of what should
be the main institutional set up that coordinates EU-
USA relations. What is the main channel of commu-
nication in case the Europeans can reach a common
position: NATO, direct EU-USA talks, including
twice-yearly meetings between the US Presidency
and the presiding EU Presidency country (twice-
yearly, because of the six-month rotation of presi-
dencies in the EU) or something else?
I hope very much the project Initiative for a
Renewed Transatlantic Partnership headed by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington can come up with a good answer. 8
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I end with a reflection and an anecdote. A Finn-
ish historian observing how Europe took shape after
the dissolution of the Roman Empire in the early 5th
century exclaims that even for a seasoned historian it
is astonishing how the hinterland of the Roman Em-
pire became the mighty Europe of the late Middle
Ages, whose influence reaches every corner of the
world today." It was Western Europe, not the East,
meaning the Byzantine empire, which lasted another
1000 years, that created most of the planet as an im-
age of itself. I would add, not a very good image, un-
fortunately. Now it seems that this imperfect image is
coming back with a vengeance, including, among other
threats, uncontrolled immigration from the imperfect
image. Illegal immigration, by the way, is a threat that
also binds the USA and Europe together in that both
sides are unable to cope with it.
At a CSIS think-tank summit at the Wye Plan-
tation in April 2005, the European participants, in-
cluding myself, were struck with the frank Ameri-
can view of the future world order: in less than 50
years the leading world's economy will be China
followed by India with the USA only at number three.
It was unclear where the EU would end up.
The anecdote is that after a group of Europe-
ans complained to the Chinese that a multi-polar
world was to be preferred to that of the American
system, the Chinese replied that a bipolar world
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